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Abstract
This paper analyzes the strategic incentives of ¯rst and second movers in sequential invest-
ment games with Stackelberg competition and price leadership on the output market. The
study shows that the follower can invest more than the leader when the outgoing spillover
from the leader to the follower is su±ciently high, taking into account the outgoing spillover
of the follower. This result tends to apply in quantity and price settings. It is also shown that
when externalities have opposite signs, the ¯rm with the lowest outgoing spillover is invest-
ing most. However, with externalities that have the same sign, the asymmetry of spillovers
determines who invests most. A beginning is made with the investigation of the robustness
of the tendencies reported.
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Firms tend to be frequently involved in strategic investments in their attempt to achieve or main-
tain sustainable competitive advantages. Strategic investments may take many forms, such as
expenditures to increase business and technological knowledge accumulation, advertising or ser-
vice outlays to develop or maintain goodwill in the market, and investments directed at modifying
product characteristics, production processes or features of the internal organization and/or the
external institutional environment.
A number of the main characteristics of these investments are fairly well understood and are
helpful in inspiring competitive analysis. Strategic investments, for example, tend to change
the parameters of the market rivalry outcomes, they may hurt or bene¯t rivals and ¯rms may
have an incentive to temper or exaggerate e®orts for strategic reasons. Some investments may
involve special features. Asymmetric information between parties involved, knowledge spillovers
and cooperation between some or all of the players involved, for example, will in°uence innovative
strategic e®orts in research and development.
In many cases strategic investments take place in an ongoing dynamic process. In some stages of
this process some players will be leading and others will be following. The followers can observe
earlier results and choices of leaders and the leaders may be able to anticipate how followers will
react. It is well known that this role playing a®ects the incentives and outcomes in quantity
competition. Mergers that seek market power, with all suppliers making simultaneous output de-
cisions, tend to reduce pro¯ts of the member ¯rms, unless the merger involves almost all suppliers.
But when the merged ¯rm can irreversibly commit to output choices and act as market leaders,
the picture for pro¯tability is much better (Daughety 1990). All of this suggests that role playing
is also likely to a®ect the incentives for and results of strategic e®orts in oligopoly.
Earlier contributions, however, tend to focus on ¯rms choosing simultaneously their strategic
investments, with some possible symmetric spillovers (De Bondt 1997). But in reality, ¯rms may
be engaged in ¯rst mover e®orts, while others imitate, catch up or even leapfrog on pioneering
moves (Halmenschlager 2004). Spillovers between leaders and followers will tend to be asymmetric,
and may carry direct negative and positive e®ects and may in°uence role playing (Amir, Amir
and Jin 2000).
In markets for video games, for example, a leader and follower may have di®erent standards. A
leader investing in an innovation promoting his standard, may lower the demand of the follower.
Investments by the follower in an innovation compatible with his own standard may reduce the
demand of the leader. In the software industry, on the other hand, the innovator may bene¯t from
research of the follower and the follower may bene¯t from the e®orts of the innovator (Crampes
3and Langinier 2003).
The intention here is to clarify the e®ects of spillovers on the strategic investments in leader follower
settings. A ¯rst objective is to see how leader and follower e®orts compare under various spillover
scenarios. Some e®orts suggest larger e®orts by leading players but followers may also be involved
in larger e®orts, because of accumulated knowledge (Doraszelski 2003) or role playing (Amir et al.
2000, Khanna and Iansiti 1997). A second objective is to see how the leader and follower e®orts
are in°uenced by spillovers and to see how, if at all, e®ects of spillovers with simultaneous choices
have to be modi¯ed.
2 The Model
In this section, the basic models of this paper are explained. First, the model with output com-
petition is expounded, followed by the model with price competition.
2.1 The Model with Output Competition
The focus is on an oligopoly market consisting of n ¯rms competing non-cooperatively on the
output market with di®erentiated or homogenous products. Of these n ¯rms, k ¯rms behave as
leaders while the remaining n ¡ k ¯rms are followers, both in the investment and in the output
stage. The leading and the following ¯rms are not necessarily symmetric. Either the ex ante
unit costs or the market size can be di®erent because of, for example, accumulated knowledge or
goodwill. The inverse demand functions of the leaders (denoted by L) and the followers (denoted
by F) are given by the following equations:
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j the total output of the leaders and the followers and
¡ ¾ a parameter denoting the degree of product di®erentiation (0 < ¾ · 1).
Each ¯rm can commit resources to strategic investments, xL and xF for respectively the leaders
and the followers, that attempt to maintain or improve its competitive position. These investments
can take many forms and result in either lower unit costs or in higher market size.
4They moreover carry spillovers to the other ¯rms in the industry. These spillovers can be positive
or negative. Positive spillovers occur, for example, when knowledge resulting from cost-reducing
R&D spills over to rival ¯rms. Negative spillovers can be a consequence of negative technological
and negative demand externalities. Four di®erent spillovers are looked at. These are:
¡ the spillovers between the leaders (±),
¡ the spillovers betweens the followers ("),
¡ the spillovers between the group of leaders and the group of followers (¯LF) and
¡ the spillovers from the group of followers to the group of leaders (¯FL).
These spillovers do not need to be equal to each other. All spillovers are assumed to be exoge-
nous.
Firm's e®orts, for example, may take the form of cost-reducing R&D investments which result
in lower ex post unit costs. Incoming positive (negative) spillovers reinforce (weaken) this cost-
reducing e®ect and ex post unit cost of the leaders and the followers (cL
expost;i and cF
expost;j) can
than be written in the following way:
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with ¿ a given parameter.













The pro¯t functions are the same when investments take the form of demand enhancing ef-
forts.
52.2 The Model with Price Competition
Firms may also compete with prices. Then, the demand functions can be calculated from equations








(AF ¡ BpF + CpL) (9)
with AL = a
L¡¾a
F
1¡¾2 , AF = a
F¡¾a
L
1¡¾2 , B = 1
1¡¾2, C = ¾
1¡¾2, i = 1:::k and j = k + 1:::n.
Again, each ¯rm invests in strategic investments intending to improve its competitive position.
These investments can carry spillovers to rival players. The same four spillovers as above are
introduced. When thinking of cost-reducing R&D investments, ex post unit cost functions can be
written as above (see (3) and (4)).
Moreover, the cost function of the e®orts is given by equation (5).














These pro¯t functions are the same whether investments are cost-reducing R&D investments or
demand enhancing e®orts.
2.3 Leading, Following Scenarios
The purpose is to analyze incentives for strategic investments in a sequential game. With more
than one leader and one follower, each ¯rm makes its decision independently from the other ¯rms
and is playing the same role. So leaders and followers make decisions simultaneously with other
leaders and followers.
There are four scenarios that can be analyzed:
¡ the early entrance game,
¡ the late entrance game,
¡ the sequential investment game with simultaneous competition and
¡ the simultaneous investment game with simultaneous competition.
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Table 1: Sequential Output (Price) Choices.
3) Sequential Investment Sequential Investments Simultaneous
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Table 2: Simultaneous Output (Price) Choices.
In an early entrance setting (see table 1), each of the leading ¯rms decides on its strategic in-
vestment xL
i , knowing that each of the n ¡ k followers will observe the e®orts of the leaders.
After observing the investments of the followers xF
j , each of the leaders will commit to an output
(price) level qL
i (pL
i ), anticipating the subsequent output (price) choices of each of the followers qF
j
(pF
j ). Followers decide on their strategic investment xF
j , observing the e®orts of the leaders and
anticipating the subsequent Stackelberg type output (price leadership type) competition.
In the late entrance game (see table 1), each leader ¯rst decides on its investment and a subsequent
output (price) level, anticipating later entry by followers. Followers will observe investment and
output (price) decisions of the leaders, and choose their best response of strategic investments
followed by output (price) choices.
To perform a check on robustness of tendencies, the above two scenarios will be compared with
two settings that involve simultaneous choices of output (prices), see table 2. Model 4 is the usual
setting in most of the strategic investment literature (see De Bondt (1997)). Model 3 has been
looked at as well (see Amir et al. (2000)).
The focus of this paper is on the early entrance scenario. Checks will be reported on the robustness
of the obtained tendencies across scenarios.
The purpose is to compare strategic investments of leaders and followers. The role of (asymmetric)
knowledge spillovers, product di®erentiation and the number of players will be analyzed. Further-
7more, the impact of asymmetric ex ante knowledge can be clari¯ed. First, the case with one leader
and one follower is analyzed. In another paragraph, the robustness of the found tendencies for the
more general n ¯rm oligopoly is looked at. Computations and simulations for these settings tend
to be complicated and are performed with the Maple program.
3 Investment incentives of the leader and the follower in a
duopoly
In this section, the general tendencies of strategic investments are analyzed in a duopoly, with one
leader and one follower. The main focus is on the comparison of the investment levels of both
players in the early entrance game with both output (in the ¯rst subsection) and price competition
(in the next subsection). Moreover, the results apply to the symmetric case, thus with equal ex
ante demand sizes (aL = aF) and equal ex ante unit costs (cL = cF).
3.1 Early entrance game with Stackelberg competition
First, the investment incentives are analyzed for the early entrance game with Stackelberg compe-
tition. After that, the same analysis is executed for the early entrance game with price leadership.
For both, the role of the spillovers is analyzed and investments are compared in di®erent scenar-
ios.
3.1.1 The role of asymmetric spillovers with Stackelberg competition
Numerous numerical simulations indicate that the asymmetry of spillovers is playing an important
role in the comparison of the investment incentives of the leader and the follower. This role of the
asymmetry of spillovers is formulated in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the early entrance game with Stackelberg competition, there exists, for each
value of ¯FL and each value of ¾, a ¯e
LF, which is called the equalizer value, so that given these
values of ¯FL and ¾:
¡ if ¯LF < ¯e
LF then xL > xF,
¡ if ¯LF = ¯e
LF then xL = xF and
¡ if ¯LF > ¯e
LF then xL < xF.
The level of this equalizer spillover ¯e
LF is always higher than ¯FL.
8Figure 1: Equalizer value, ¯e
LF, in the early entrance game with Stackelberg competition as a
function of ¯FL for a given ¾.
In ¯gure 1, this equalizer value ¯e
LF is plotted in function of ¯FL for a given value of ¾. The curve
of ¯e
LF roughly divides the two dimensional spillover space in two sections, namely a region with
rather high ¯LF and rather low ¯FL (area shaded with the dotted lines on ¯gure 1) and another
region with rather low ¯LF and rather high ¯FL (area shaded with the full lines on ¯gure 1).
Spillover combinations above the ¯e
LF curve yield higher investments of the follower, while those
below the ¯e
LF curve result in higher investment incentives of the leader.
In the absence of spillovers, the leader has higher investment incentives than the follower due to
its ¯rst mover advantage in the market competition. In ¯gure 1, this is represented by the origin
lying under the ¯e
LF curve. The presence of spillovers, however, can change those incentives to
invest in strategic investments. If the spillover from the leader to the follower is high compared to
the spillover from the follower to the leader, the investment incentives are reversed, so the follower
invests more than the leader.
It can be veri¯ed that the introduction of (sequential) strategic investments can have an impact on
the typical Stackelberg obtained tendencies without investments. For highly asymmetric spillover
combinations with ¯LF > ¯FL, the leader can lose his ¯rst mover advantage when ¾ 2 [0;¾¤[
(with ¾¤ dependent on ¯LF and ¯FL and ¼L = ¼F when ¾ = ¾¤), resulting in a higher pro¯t for
the follower than for the leader.
93.1.2 Comparison investment incentives in four di®erent scenarios
Externalities describe the impact of strategic investments, made by one ¯rm, on the pro¯ts of
the rival ¯rms and are either positive or negative.1 Although the sign and magnitude of the
externalities are not equal to the spillovers, both concepts are clearly related to each other.
The sign and magnitude of the externalities on the leader and on the follower are given, respectively,







4 ¡ ¾2 (13)
The sign and magnitude of the externalities are thus determined by the outgoing spillover of the
rival and the degree of product di®erentiation. Contrary to the traditional two stage models with
simultaneous strategic investments, simultaneous output decisions and symmetric spillovers, the
externalities in the early entrance game can be asymmetric (i.e. one externality is positive while
the other is negative), due to the possibility of asymmetric spillovers.
There are four possible scenarios, dependent on the sign of the externalities, namely
¡ ´FL > 0 and ´LF > 0 when ¯FL is high and ¯LF is high,
¡ ´FL < 0 and ´LF < 0 when ¯FL is low and is ¯LF is low,
¡ ´FL > 0 and ´LF < 0 when ¯FL is high and is ¯LF is low and
¡ ´FL < 0 and ´LF > 0 when ¯FL is low and is ¯LF is high
with ´FL (´LF) representing the externality on the leader (follower) 2.
Numerical simulations lead to the following proposition, which is also represented in ¯gure 2.
Proposition 2 In the early entrance game with Stackelberg competition, the leader (follower)
commits, in general, most resources on strategic investments when the externality on the leader is
positive (negative) and the externality on the follower is negative (positive). However, when the
sign of the externalities is the same, the comparison of strategic investment levels does not depend
on the sign of the externalities but on the asymmetry of spillover levels.






with i = 1;:::;k and j = k + 1;:::;n.





with i = 1;:::;k and j = k + 1;:::;n.
2¯FL is high when term (12) is positive (negative) and ¯LF is high (low) when term (13) is positive (negative)
10Figure 2: Comparison of strategic investments of the leader and the follower related to externalities.
For example, when ´FL < 0 and ´LF > 0, which can be seen as the traditional imitation case, the
leader will be reluctant to invest as its investment positively in°uences the pro¯ts of the follower.
Contrary, bene¯ting from the investments made by the leader, the follower has high incentives to
invest. The result is that the follower invests more than the leader, consistent with the fact that
the innovation (imitation) creates a positive (negative) externality on the follower's pro¯t (leader's
pro¯t).
An example of the traditional imitation game can be found in the emerging satellite radio market
in North America (Besanko and Braeutigam 2005). The only two players in this market are XM
Satellite Radio and Sirius Satellite Radio. XM entered the new market in September 2001, almost
one year before Sirus. In order to inform the public about its service and satellites radios in
general, XM has executed advertising campaigns, which had a positive impact on the demand size
of XM but also on the demand size of Sirius. Thus, these campaigns carry a positive spillover from
XM to Sirius. Sirius, on the other hand, entered the satellite radio market nearly a year After
XM. Although Sirius also did some advertising e®orts, the spillover from Sirius to XM is negative
as Sirius' technology is incompatible with XM's technology, lowering the demand size of XM. As
negative spillovers always lead to negative externalities (see 12), XM is hurt by the investments
of Sirius. The positive spillover from the XM to Sirius are probably high, resulting in a positive
externality on Sirius.
On the other hand, it is also possible that leaders bene¯t from e®orts by the follower but that
the follower may be hurt by the leader's e®orts. Than the leader will invest more than the
follower.
When both ¯rms bene¯t from each other investments, both ¯rm's outgoing spillovers are rather
high. The comparison of the investment levels of the leader and the follower is not dependent on
11Figure 3: Equalizer value, ¯e
LF, in the early entrance game with price leadership as a function of
¯FL for a given ¾.
the sign of the externalities, but, as is shown in ¯rgure 2, is now determined by the asymmetry
of the spillovers, as stated in proposition 1. The same applies for the case where both the leader
and the follower are hurt by the strategic e®orts of each other.
3.2 Early entrance game with price leadership
The following analysis concerns the comparison of strategic investments of the leader and the
follower in the early entrance game with price leadership.
3.2.1 The role of asymmetric spillovers with price leadership
Asymmetric spillovers do also play a crucial role in the comparison of strategic e®orts of the leader
and the follower when ¯rms compete with their price. The result of the simulations is formulated
in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 In the early entrance game with price leadership, there exists, for each value of
¯FL and each value of ¾, a ¯e
LF, which is called the equalizer value, so that given these values of
¯FL and ¾:
¡ if ¯LF < ¯e
LF then xL > xF,
¡ if ¯LF = ¯e
LF then xL = xF and
¡ if ¯LF > ¯e
LF then xL < xF.
12The general tendency with respect to the comparison of investments of the leader and the follower
in the early entrance game with price leadership is thus more or less the same as with Stackelberg
leadership. However, the values for the equalizer spillover, ¯e
LF, di®er compared to Stackelberg
competition.
Proposition 3 indicates that the spillover asymmetry is crucial for the comparison of investment
levels of the leader and the follower. This can also be seen in ¯gure 3. Asymmetric spillover
combinations with rather high ¯LF and rather low ¯FL result in higher investment of the follower,
which is represented by the part above the curve of the equalizer value (area shaded with dotted
lines). Reverse spillover combinations lead to xL > xF. Consequently, the equalizer spillover value
¯e
LF roughly divides the spillover space in two regions, namely one region with higher investments
of the leader (area shaded with full lines) and another region where the follower invests most (area
shaded with dotted lines above the ¯e
LF curve).
Without strategic investments, the price follower has a second mover advantage. Observing the
price of the leader, the follower sets a lower price by which he captures a higher market share
than the leader. When there are no spillovers, the follower invests more than the leader. How-
ever, asymmetric spillovers with ¯FL > ¯LF, can change this relation so that the leader invest
most.
In a price leadership setting without strategic investments, the follower sets a slightly lower price
than the observed price of the leader, by which the follower is able to capture a higher market
share and to realize a higher pro¯t. In other words, the follower enjoys a second mover advantage.
However, the introduction of (sequential) strategic investments can alter this general characteristic.
When spillovers are highly asymmetric with ¯FL > ¯LF, it is possible that the leader gets the
highest pro¯t. The second mover advantage is than transformed into a ¯rst mover advantage when
¾ 2 [0;¾o[, with ¾o dependent on ¯LF and ¯FL and ¼L = ¼F when ¾ = ¾o.
3.2.2 Comparison investment incentives in four di®erent scenarios
Strategic investments of the leader and the follower are now compared with each other in four
di®erent scenarios, based on the sign of the externalities. Although the demand functions are
derived from the equations (1) and (2), the terms determining the sign and magnitude of the
externality on respectively the leader (´FL) and on the follower (´LF) are not the same as in the
early entrance game with Stackelberg competition but are given by:
¯FL ¡
¾
2 ¡ ¾2 (14)
13Figure 4: Comparison of strategic investments of the leader and the follower related to externalities.
¯LF ¡
¾(2 ¡ ¾2)
4 ¡ 3¾2 (15)
Obviously, the sign and magnitude of the externalities is again determined by the outgoing spillover
of the rival and the degree of product di®erentiation. Asymmetric spillovers result in the possibility
of having asymmetric externalities (di®erent sign). The same four scenarios as in paragraph 3.1.2.
are looked at. The general tendency is represented in ¯gure 4 and can be formulated in proposition
4.
Proposition 4 In the early entrance game with price leadership, the leader (follower) commits
in general most resources on strategic investments when the externality on the leader is positive
(negative) and the externality on the follower is negative (positive). However, when the sign of
the externalities is the same, the comparison of strategic investment levels does not depend on the
sign externalities but on the spillover levels.
As proposition 4 is similar to proposition 2, the tendencies of the comparison of strategic invest-
ments in the di®erent scenarios in the early entrance game with price leadership are more ore less
the same as with Stackelberg leadership.
4 Impact of sequential competition
In this section, the robustness of the tendencies formulated in proposition 1 and 3 is looked at
by analyzing model 3 and model 4 (see table 2). First, the tendencies of the early entrance game
with Stackelberg competition are compared with two models with Cournot competition. Second,
a similar analysis is performed for the models with price competition (price leadership versus
Bertrand competition).
144.1 Simultaneous Output Choices
Next to Stackelberg leadership, ¯rms can also compete with quantities µ a la Cournot, thus choosing
quantities simultaneously. In model 3, one ¯rm is taking the lead in the investment stages (without
loss of generality, ¯rm 1 is the leader). However, on the output market, both ¯rms compete
simultaneously.
The comparison of the investment incentives of the leader and the follower in model 3, which has
been analyzed by Amir et al. (2000), can be described by using proposition 5.
Proposition 5 In the simultaneous output choice game with sequential investments, there exists,
for each value of ¯FL and each value of ¾, a ¯e
LF, which is called the equalizer value, so that given
these values of ¯FL and ¾:
¡ if ¯LF < ¯e
LF then xL > xF,
¡ if ¯LF = ¯e
LF then xL = xF and
¡ if ¯LF > ¯e
LF then xL < xF.
The level of this equalizer spillover ¯e
LF is always higher than ¯FL.
This proposition is similar to proposition 1 concerning the equalizer value ¯e
LF with Stackelberg
competition. However, the level of this equalizer spillover is always lower with simultaneous output
choices than with Stackelberg competition. This indicates the impact of the competition mode on
the comparison of investment incentives of the leader and the follower.
Comparing the investment incentives of the leader (follower) in model 1 and model 3, the incentives
of the Stackelberg leader are not necessarily higher than the incentives of the investment leader
with Cournot competition3. The incentives of the follower, on the contrary, are always lower with
sequential (model 1) than with simultaneous output choices (model 3).
Model 4 is the basic two stage game, as have been introduced by D'Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988), but more generalized for di®erent degrees of product di®erentiation (De Bondt and Veugel-
ers 1991) and asymmetric spillovers (Attalah 2005, De Bondt and Henriques 1995). In this model,
one ¯rm invests more than the other ¯rm if its outgoing spillover is the lowest. The asymmetry
of spillovers determines completely the comparison of investment incentives of the leader and the
follower as the equalizer value of ¯LF in model 4 is equal to ¯FL.
Based on the ¯ndings in this paragraph and paragraph 3.1.1, it is possible to conclude that the
tendencies of the comparison of strategic investments of the leader and the follower are more or
3Stackelberg leader's investment incentives are more sensitive to the outgoing spillover ¯LF than the incentives
of the Cournot leader (j @xL
@¯LF j is higher with Stackelberg competition than with Cournot competition).
15less the same in the di®erent scenarios (model 1, model 3 and model 4). However, the value of the
equalizer spillover ¯e
LF is the highest in the early entrance game and the lowest in the two stage
game (model 4).
4.2 Simultaneous Price Choices
With Bertrand competition, ¯rms decide simultaneously on their prices. Then, investment deci-
sions can be taken sequentially (model 3) or simultaneously (model 4).
When ¯rms take investment decisions sequentially and competing with prices simultaneously, the
general tendency of the comparison of the investments of the leader and the follower is roughly
the same as with price leadership and can be summarized by formulating proposition 6.
Proposition 6 In the simultaneous price choice game with sequential investments, there exists,
for each value of ¯FL and each value of sigma, a ¯e
LF, which is called the equalizer value, so that
given these values of ¯FL and ¾:
¡ if ¯LF < ¯e
LF then xL > xF,
¡ if ¯LF = ¯e
LF then xL = xF and
¡ if ¯LF > ¯e
LF then xL < xF.
Simultaneous price decisions do not change the tendencies of strategic investments with sequential
price choices. However, the equalizer value of ¯LF in model is in general, slightly higher than the
equalizer value of ¯LF in the early entrance game, for given values ¯FL and ¾.
In model 4, the two ¯rms choose simultaneously their investment levels. Just like in the two stage
game with Cournot competition, a ¯rm will invest more than its rival when its outgoing spillover
is lower than the the outgoing spillover of the rival ¯rm. In other words, the equalizer value for
¯LF is equal to ¯FL.
5 Conclusions
The major ¯nding of this paper is that the comparison of the strategic investments of a leading and
a following ¯rm in a game with sequential investment and sequential output (price) decisions is
mainly determined by the spillover asymmetry. These tendencies are more or less the same whether
¯rms compete sequentially with quantities (early entrance game with Stackelberg competition) or
with prices (early entrance game with price leadership).
16Moreover, games with simultaneous market competition yield similar results. However, the exact
value of the equalizer spillover ¯e
LF di®er among the several games.
Furthermore, with asymmetric externalities, the ¯rm bene¯ting from the investment of his rival,
invests most. However, when externalities are symmetric, the comparison of the incentives of the
leader and the follower relies on the asymmetry of spillovers.
Future research plans with respect to this topic are the following. Firstly, the robustness of the
found tendencies (proposition 1-4) must be further checked with the more general oligopoly with
k leaders and n ¡ k followers. Doing so creates also the opportunity to introduce cooperation
among leaders and/or followers. The role playing tendencies need to be looked at also.
17Appendix
All games in this paper are solved with the technique of backward induction.
Early Entrance Game with Stackelberg Competition
Maximizing the pro¯t of the follower in the fourth stage, yields the following equation for the




((a ¡ c) + (xF + ¯LFxL) ¡ ¾qL) (16)
The leader anticipates this output level of the follower and maximizes its pro¯t in the third stage.




((2 ¡ ¾)(a ¡ c) + (2 ¡ ¾¯LF)xL + (2¯FL ¡ ¾)xF)
2 ¡ ¾2 (17)




(4 ¡ 2¾ ¡ ¾2)(a ¡ c) + ((4 ¡ ¾2)¯LF ¡ 2¾)xL + (4 ¡ ¾2 ¡ 2¾¯FL)xF
2 ¡ ¾2 (18)




(qL)2 ¡ (¿=2)(xL)2 (19)
¼F = (qF)2 ¡ (¿=2)(xF)2 (20)
In the second stage, the follower observers the investment level of the leader and optimizes its own




qF (4 ¡ ¾2 ¡ 2¾¯FL)
4(2 ¡ ¾2)
: (21)
The leader anticipates the amount of resources the follower will spend and commits to a investment





which is an expression in terms of ¯LF, ¯FL, ¾, a, c and ¿. The solutions of xL and xF can
be obtained by solving (22), (22), (16) and (17). The software Maple is used to accomplish this
complicated tasks.
18Early Entrance Game with Price Leadership
With price leadership in the competition stage, the follower observes the price of the leader and
then maximizes its pro¯t by choosing its optimal price. This price is given by:
pF =
(1 ¡ ¾)a + c ¡ ¯LFxL ¡ xF ¡ ¾pL
2
(23)
The price leader, deciding on its optimal price in the third stage, anticipates (23. Optimizing its
pro¯t function leads the following equation for its price:
pL =
(2 ¡ ¾2)(a + c) ¡ ¾(a ¡ c) ¡ (2 + ¾¯LF + ¾2)xL ¡ ((2 ¡ ¾2) + ¾)xF
2(2 ¡ ¾2)
(24)
Substituting (24) into equation (23), results in the following equation for the price of the fol-
lower:
pF =
4(a + c) ¡ ¾2(3a + c) + (¾3 ¡ 2¾)(a ¡ c) ¡ (4¯LF + 2¾ + ¾2¯LF ¡ ¾3)xL ¡ (4 + 2¯FL ¡ ¾2 ¡ ¯FL¾3)xF
4(2 ¡ ¾2)
(25)




(qL)2 ¡ (¿=2)(xL)2) (26)




with qL and qF given by the following expressions:
qL =




(4 ¡ 2¾ ¡ 3¾2 + ¾3)(a ¡ c) + (4¯LF ¡ 3¾2¯LF + ¾3)xL + (4 ¡ 2¯FL¾ ¡ 3¾2 + ¯FL¾3)xF
4(1 ¡ ¾2)(2 ¡ ¾2)
(29)





(4 ¡ 2¯FL¾ ¡ 3¾2 + ¯FL¾3)
4(1 ¡ ¾2)(2 ¡ ¾2)
: (30)






(2 ¡ ¾¯LF ¡ ¾2): (31)
19Solving the equation (30) and (31) results in the following solutions for xL and xF. These solutions
are given by Maple.
The investment level of the follower xF, in function of xL, is given by the following equation. The
solutions of xL and xF can be obtained by solving (30), (31), (28) and (29). The software Maple
is used to accomplish this complicated task
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